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Abstract— In Distributed environment authentication and key-
exchange mechanisms plays a major role. Generally in authentication 
a client and server agree upon a cryptographic key which is mutually 
exchanged. Earlier passwords were stored in a single server where if 
an intruder gains access of that server by some malicious attacks then 
all the passwords stored in the database are to be compromised and 
therefore the e-commerce application security is endangered. In-order 
to improve the efficiency and performance of the authentication 
mechanisms we involve multiple servers to store the passwords and 
participate in key-exchange and authentication process so as to 
ensure that even a single server is compromised the whole system’s 
security is not in threat and also generating a nonce values randomly 
for every session corresponds to a two level security mechanism 
where the scope of an attacker to pretend as the legitimate user and 
login into the system is completely restricted. 
In this model the passwords are stored in their equivalent hash 
values and they are spitted into multiple servers. Making it even more 
difficult for the attacker to determine the password even by reverse 
engineering he cannot intercept the actual password form segments of 
hash value. Hence, we can present this model as safe and secure 
password based authentication scheme using key exchange 
mechanism. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Passwords are basic entities of authentication and security, mainly in 
Distributed environment they play crucial role in authenticating 
legitimate users. The authentication systems which use passwords to 
authenticate are cost effective and are also easy to use. Users have to 
register with a password and remember it to login, irrespective of the 
device used. Passwords are strings or characters used to approve the 
access to gain privilege for a resource which is to be maintained 
confidential from other individuals who aren’t given the access of a 
particular resource. The urge to develop a strong authentication 
system led to the advent of cryptography and many more 
authentication schemes like hierarchical identity based encryption 
scheme [6] with less no. of key exchanges. Authentication refers to 
sharing common information over a channel where they are 
compared and upon verified with those stored in database. If they 
match user is authenticated or-else reverted back prompting to 
provide with correct password in the other case. 
 
 Earlier passwords were hashed and their hash value was transmitted 
over a public channel leaving scope to an attacker to crack the 
password from hashed value by testing possible passwords and some 
advanced tools. Gradually, mechanisms are being developed which 
are capable of protecting passwords from eavesdropping or other 
guessing attacks by any means. In distributed computing environment 
these advanced techniques lead to the scenario where a client and a 
server can mutually authenticate by means of a password and a 
cryptographic key shared among them and this seem to be a primary 
and mandate feature where using key exchange mechanisms, server 
store the passwords (in terms of their equivalent hash values) and 
provide secure authentication for genuine and legitimate users 
prompting to login.  
 
Key exchange refers to the mutual sharing of common password or 
credentials by establishing a cryptographic key to ensure any 
unauthorized user isn’t allowed to participate in the session so as to 
prevent any brute force attacks on the credentials. User authentication 
through a single server has a risk that if the database is hacked by any 
means whole set of encrypted passwords are gained access and has a 
chance that they are used for illegitimate purposes thus leaving the 
server weak for using in password based authentication systems. The 
attacker by eaves-dropping the hash values communicated through 
any insecure channel can determine the password by trying with a 
wide number of possible passwords by brute-forcing and thus if a 
server is attacked and gained access it is possible to evaluate all the 
stored passwords and they are subjected to misuse. 
 
 The passwords stored in the server’s database may also be 
sometimes exposed as they are easily prone to attacks where incase if 
the same password is used for other online service such as banking 
etc.., the confidentiality  of credentials is  being Compromised and 
due to a weak server the user’s other online services are subjected to 
risk. This leads to continuous study and development of a secure 
authentication mechanism which further results in regular 
modifications as per the security requirements in distributed systems 
environment. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
In 1976 a cryptographic protocol was developed by Hellman’s 
student Ralph Merkie which is published as a cryptographic protocol 
by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman[1]. It enables its users to 
securely exchange keys even in-case of eavesdropping by third 
person. This exchange protocol however itself doesn’t respond in 
authentication. It’s crucial when a third person can eavesdrop at other 
end. 
 
        In-case of a single server if access to this server is gained 
through malicious attacks all the users passwords stored in the 
server’s database are disclosed. To resolve this issue a PKI based 
model was proposed in 2000 by Ford and Kaliski where ‘n’ servers 
are involved in authenticating a client. It remained secure until only 
‘n-1’ servers are attacked. Further a password only model was 
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suggested with similar mechanism in 2001 by Joblon[5]. In 2002 
another protocol in PKI model which requires only ‘x’ among ‘n’ 
servers to participate in authentication until ‘x-1’ servers remained 
secure was proposed by MacKenzie  which provided a formal 
security for PAKE protocol in random oracle model[3]. A password 
only model was proposed in 2003 by Di Raimondo and Gennaro in 
which < 1/3 servers are required to be compromised with formal 
security model. 
 
The first two-server model in PKI based setting was developed in 
2003 by Brainard, in this a secure channel is assumed between the 
client and server which used public key technique implementations. 
The first two server password only authenticated key exchange 
protocol with a security standard model was proposed by Katz in 
2005. This further extended and developed as Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung 
(KOY protocol)[2] and distributed key issuing protocol [7] based 
user identity which is taken as public key. In this protocol each server 
and client agree upon a common secret session key which is 
symmetric and two servers equally contribute in client authentication 
and their key exchange. Client action remains same whereas a server 
functions twice to thrice of its regular implementations against 
malicious attacks. Here two servers run in parallel which can be 
counted as an advantage despite its inefficiency in practical 
implementation. In-order to safeguard from a single point of threat a 
two server model was proposed in 2006. This model involved three 
elements users, Control server and a service server. 
 
 In 2007 a two server PAKE protocol with low number of round-off’s 
in their communication was proposed by Jin. Here, client 
authenticates each other by verifying if they agree on common 
session key. In this paper we deal with a two server authentication 
PAKE protocol which makes both the servers to run in parallel with 
improved efficiency. We implement a two server scheme based on 
PAKE protocol where passwords are replaced by hash values by their 
equivalent hash values in-order to avoid plain text attack and also 
maintain confidentiality and they are stored in databases of both the 
servers by splitting[3]. Such that if a single server among ‘n’ servers 
is compromised too then also our system remains safe and secure 
leaving no scope for any malicious activities that could gain access of 
our system. The protocol is robust among offline dictionary attacks 
and also as an active adversary provided the parameters in need of 
control server to authenticate. 
 
III. CONTRIBUTION 
This model deals with two-server authentication scheme using key 
exchange where the password among the multiple servers from the 
client side is stored in the form of their equivalent hash values and is 
split among the servers in an appropriate order. The intruder incase 
caught hold of one server may not be able to attack all the servers 
participating in authentication process and by any means if he does 
so, he may not intercept the exact password by reverse engineering 
the hash functions and re-arranging all the split values. 
 
The scheme is initiated by firstly registration of user. It involves 
designating the username and password of the user to the server 
where the equivalent hash values are determined and they are spitted 
into ‘n’ segments and stored in ‘n‘ servers for future reference. The 
number of spits is equal to number of servers available and it depends 
on the level of security the administrator wants to implement for his 
authentication system. When the user tries to login in with those 
credentials after successful submission the servers crosscheck with 
the respective usernames and the existing password corresponding to 
that username thus let us assume if two servers are participating in 
authentication then both the servers combine the hash-values and 
verify if the entered password hash value matches with that of the 
passwords stored in the servers. Thus upon successful verification the 
user is sent a nonce value randomly generated for that particular 
session. After this two step verification the server grants the access to 
the user declaring him as the legitimate user with respective 
privileges. User authentication implementation scheme result is as 
shown in figure1.  
 
 
 
 
The main aspect of this model is to ensure the system is safe even if 
one or more serves are compromised. As it is a tedious task to 
determine the password among the multiple servers by cracking the 
hash values. Even if the attacker tries with the replay attack the server 
can easily identify as he may not forge the nonce value which is 
randomly generated for every active session by the server. Still the 
process of developing a more susceptible model is being carried out 
in-order to improve the overall efficiency and performance resulting 
in a strong key-exchange mechanism involving multiple servers in 
distributed environment.  
 
As per the analysis our model  is safe and secure to most frequent 
prone attacks a more deeper analysis is to be done to ensure the 
system is completely safe and secure to withstand among the real-
time existing protocols for authentication and key-exchange 
distributed environment.  
 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Our protocol ensures mutual authentication among the user and 
multiple servers and is presumed to be immune as far as tested with 
replay attack, offline dictionary attack, the authentication protocols 
proposed are prone to one or more security attacks once the server is 
compromised incase of single server systems but in our model as we 
involve multiple servers where the passwords in equivalent hash 
values are split and stored in multiple servers thereby reducing the 
scope of the server and our authentication scheme to be attacked or 
cracked by any means. As per the analysis we’ve done so far our 
model is resistant to some of the security breaches listed below 
 
1. Impersonation attack: 
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In this attack, the attacker randomly assumes the security 
parameters and tries to access the system as a legitimate 
user. But In our protocol as we store the hash values of the 
passwords and they are split into servers it’s a tedious task 
for an attacker to guess all the security parameters 
including the hash valued password and combine all its 
split values in respective order 
 
2. Replay attack: 
 
Here, the attacker intercepts all the logs exchanged between 
the user and servers and tried to replay the same 
communication pretending to be a legitimate user. But 
replaying the same messages is proven to be vague as we 
propose randomly generated sessions keys for each session 
in the authentication scheme. 
 
3. Leak of Verifier attack: 
 
The attacker by any means gain access to a server and 
eavesdrop all the messages communicated between the user 
and server but as we involve the participation of multiple 
servers in our model attacking a single server and gaining 
access to security parameters stored in that server isn’t 
sufficient to be authenticated as a legitimate user. 
 
4. Offline dictionary attack: 
 
If the attacker eavesdrop the communication channel and 
tries to intercept the password by means of guessing and 
some password cracking tools he ends up in nothing as its 
very difficult to determine the password by reverse 
engineering a hash function exactly and determine the 
password by combining the password which is split into 
multiple servers  
CONCLUSION 
This model serves the authentication and key-exchange mechanisms 
under a secure channel where incase if one or multiple (n-1) servers 
are compromised even then the intruder cannot determine the 
password as they are hashed and the hash values are split into 
multiple servers making it further more difficult for the intruder to 
crack the password. Thus, our mechanism justifies the concept of 
secure authentication and key exchange and as per the analysis the 
current model can withstand passive and active attacks and there is 
always scope for continuously improving and developing more 
advanced and strong defending mechanisms in authentication and 
key-exchange protocols. 
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